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1. Introduction 
The opinions about the relative importance of different determinants of corporate payout 
vary across both scholars and financial mangers (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Brav et al., 2003; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2004). For instance, Correia da Silva et al. (2004) cite part of a letter written 
to the major UK companies by Michael McLintock, the CEO of M&G, part of Prudential and one 
of  the  largest  institutional  investors  in  the  UK.  In  this  letter  McLintock  argues  that  ‘the 
investment case for dividends in the majority of circumstances is a strong and well-supported 
one, has stood the test of time, and is likely to be increasingly appreciated in the economic and 
stock market conditions which we seem likely to face for the foreseeable future.’
1 This view does 
not appear to be uniformly shared by the investment community. Apparently, some investment 
bankers admit ‘telling their clients that paying dividends is like an admission that you have 
nothing better to do.’
2  
Although  the  seminal  research  in  this  area  dates  back  to  Lintner  (1956),  Miller  and 
Modigliani (1961), and Black (1976), the controversy about why firms should pay dividends has 
not been satisfactorily resolved.
3 This paper contributes to this debate as it assesses empirically 
the  contrasting  predictions  of  agency  theories  of  payout  (Rozeff,  1982;  Easterbrook,  1984; 
Jensen, 1986) and the implications of the pecking order models (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). In particular, the paper derives and tests a set of hypotheses pertaining to the impact of 
shareholder  control  concentration  on  the  firms’  payout ratios.
4 We argue  that the  controlling 
                                                 
1 The Financial Times. October 8, 2002. 
2 The Economist. November 18, 1999. 
3 The well-known textbook of Brealey and Myers (2003) deems the dividend controversy to be among the ‘10 
unsolved problems in finance’. 
4 Recent theoretical and empirical studies relating ownership and payout include among others Eckbo and Verma 
(1994), Lucas and McDonald (1998), Allen et al. (2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), Grinstein and Michaely (2002), 
Short et al. (2002), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Perez-Gonzalez (2003), Farinha (2003), Gugler (2003), Brav et al. 
(2003), and Baker and Wurgler (2004).  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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shareholders trade off the agency problems of free cash flow against the risk of underinvestment, 
and try to enforce payout policies that optimally balance these two costs. 
In  addition,  the  role  of  share  repurchase  plans  (as  a  way  of  disbursing  funds  to 
shareholders) has recently increased both in the US (Grullon and Michaely, 2002) and the UK 
(Oswald and Young, 2004). Therefore, contrary to the existing studies that have analyzed payout 
policies in the UK, we do not restrict our attention to one payout channel only (either dividends, 
or repurchases), and we investigate the factors that determine total payout.
5 
This paper complements the existing literature in several ways. First, we investigate the 
relationship between the dynamics of earnings payout and the voting power enjoyed by different 
types of shareholders. This allows us to test a set of hypotheses derived from agency and pecking 
order theories. Second, we address the problem of control measurement and advocate the use of 
Banzhaf indices as a relevant measure of voting power in the analysis of corporate policy choices. 
According  to  our  best  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  study  employing  those  game theory-based 
concepts in the context of corporate payout policies. Third, we extend the traditional framework 
proposed  by  Lintner  (1956)  and suggest  an econometrically sound approach  to modeling the 
dynamics of the total payout. Whereas most – even recent – studies on payout policy show some 
methodological flaws, we apply state-of-the-art dynamic panel data estimation procedures.   
  We analyze a large panel of UK firms for the 1990s and find that the payout policy is 
significantly related to control concentration. Expectedly, profitability is a crucial determinant of 
payout decisions, but the presence of strong block holders or block holder coalitions weakens the 
relationship between the corporate earnings and the payout dynamics. Block holders appear to 
realize that an overly generous payout may render the company to be liquidity constrained, and, 
consequently, result in suboptimal investment policy. While the impact of the voting power of 
shareholders’ coalitions on payout ratios is found to be always negative, the magnitude of this 
effect differs across different categories of block holders (i.e. industrial firms, outside individuals, 
                                                 
5 For the UK, Bond et al. (1996), Lasfer (1996), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), Short et al. (2002), Farinha (2003), 
Lasfer and Zenonos (2003), Correia da Silva et al. (2004) analyze dividend policy only, while Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) and Oswald and Young (2004) focus exclusively on factors determining repurchase decisions. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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directors, financial institutions). The results challenge some of the implications of the agency 
theories of payout, and favor a pecking-order explanation for the observed patterns. Our analysis 
of payout dynamics reveals also that companies adjust payout policies to changes in earnings 
only gradually, which is consistent with ‘dividend smoothing’ as documented in the literature. In 
fact,  our  results  suggest  a  presence  of  a  more  general  phenomenon  of  the  ‘total  payout 
smoothing’.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the background 
literature, develops research hypotheses, and motivates the control variables used in the study. 
Subsequent part describes data and methodology used in the paper. Results of the analyses are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the extensions and robustness checks, while Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Payout policy and ownership structure: Background literature and hypotheses 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) were the first to challenge the popular belief that higher 
payout  translates  into  higher  firm  value.  Under  the  restrictive  conditions  of  perfect  capital 
markets, any mix of retained earnings and payout will not affect firm value. Subsequent literature 
advances several theoretical justifications for firms’ payout choices. Our paper takes an agency 
perspective as a starting point for explaining payout policy.
6 The agency models of payout relax 
the original Miller and Modigliani (1961) assumption about the independence of dividend and 
investment policies of the firm. Whenever a firm suffers from agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, payout policy may provide a partial remedy (Rozeff, 1982). Distributing funds 
to shareholders by means of dividends or share repurchases forces firms to raise capital externally 
in order to finance new projects and, consequently, to be submitted to the discipline of the market 
(Easterbrook, 1984). A commitment to pay out funds to shareholders (either as dividends or as 
                                                 
6 Other explanations include, for instance, taxation, signaling arguments, institutional constraints, and behavioral 
considerations (Allen and Michaely, 2003). While we acknowledge that some of these factors may affect firms’ 
payout choices, a full analysis of all those possible explanations is beyond the scope of this paper. Bond et al. (1996), 
Lasfer (1996), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), Rau and Vermaelen (2002), and Oswald and Young (2004) extensively 
discuss the empirical relevance of those arguments (in particular, taxation) in the UK context.  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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repurchases) reduces the amount of free cash flows that managers could otherwise spend on value 
reducing  projects  (Jensen,  1986).  Fluck  (1999)  develops  a  model,  in  which  the  amount  of 
dividends depends on the outsiders’ effectiveness in disciplining the management. In the model 
proposed by Allen et al. (2000), firms pay high dividends in order to attract lower-taxed investors 
(i.e. financial institutions) who may have an advantage in detecting firm quality and ensuring that 
firms are well managed.  
  The relationship between control structures and payout is a focus of several empirical 
studies.  Using  US  data,  Zeckhauser  and  Pound  (1990)  do  not  find  significant  differences  in 
payout ratios between firms with and without large block holders. Consequently, they conclude 
that  ownership  concentration  and  payout  policy  cannot  be  considered  substitute  monitoring 
devices.  For  German  firms,  the  vast  majority  of  which  is  characterized  by  strong  investor 
(groups) holding majority control, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) document that the power of the 
largest equity holder reduces the dividend payout ratio whereas the power of the second largest 
shareholder increases the payout. Also for Germany, Goergen et al. (2004) find that, given that 
strong  shareholders  exert  their  control  power,  there  is  no  need  for  the  dividend  policy  to 
constitute  an  additional  monitoring  device.  Moh’d  et  al.  (1995)  find  that,  in  the  US,  more 
dispersed ownership (as measured by the number of owners) results in higher payout ratios. The 
identity  of  the  block  holders  is  found  to  affect  the  payout  ratios  as  well.  A  high  payout  in 
companies with considerable institutional ownership is consistent with the idea that dividends are 
used as a way of compensating block holders for their monitoring activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986).  Moh’d  et  al.  (1995)  document  that  larger  managerial  ownership  translates  into  lower 
dividend payout ratios, while larger institutional stakes are associated with higher payout.
7 Using 
                                                 
7  Eckbo  and Verma  (1994)  test  a  very similar prediction employing a sample of Canadian firms. Still, in their 
theoretical model and the discussion of empirical results, they consider managerial preferences for high payout and 
institutional  preferences  for  a  low  one  to  be  largely  exogenous  (and  not  necessarily  driven  by  the  agency 
considerations).  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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UK data, Short et al. (2002) obtain a similar result and interpret it as a support for the free cash 
flow explanation of payout (Jensen, 1986).
8  
Most  of  the  existing  agency  models  involving  payout  policy  hinge  on  the  implicit 
assumption that firms can be refinanced frictionlessly (without additional costs) by the external 
capital markets when they need funds to undertake new investment projects. Consequently, for a 
firm with value-enhancing investment opportunities, an optimal strategy minimizing agency costs 
can consist of maintaining a high payout to reduce the amount of free cash flow and of raising 
new outside capital. In particular, such a policy can be imposed by strong outside block holders 
(like  corporations,  or  individuals  or  families)  who  intend  to  curb  managerial  propensity  to 
overinvest.  As  a  result,  the  corporate  resources  that  can  be  spent  by  management  on  value 
reducing projects are limited. The underlying idea is that, once the free cash flow is returned to 
the shareholders, the external capital markets screen managerial investment proposals and can 
impede  inefficient  investments  by  setting  a  prohibitive  cost  of  capital  (Easterbrook,  1984). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that strong voting power held by outside shareholders like industrial 
firms,  and  families  or  individuals  (not  related  to  a  director),  increases  the  payout  ratio 
(Hypothesis 1). 
Contrarily, firms in which directors hold substantial voting power may opt for low payout 
ratios. High earnings retention may allow managers to enjoy substantial private benefits (e.g. 
perquisites) associated with excess cash flow and corporate growth resulting from negative net 
present value projects (Jensen, 1986). According to this agency view, managers, whose control 
power is difficult to challenge, are able to enforce such a strategy.
9 Thus, we hypothesize that the 
                                                 
8 Also Farinha (2003) invokes agency arguments to explain the relationship between insider ownership and dividend 
payout in the UK. 
9 Managerial equity stake also helps to align the interests of management and shareholders (Jensen et al., 1992). If, 
due to this alignment, the severity of the manager-shareholder agency conflict is low, payout ratios in a firm with 
substantial  managerial  holdings  may  be  low not  only  because managers are  able to  secure  the  funds for lavish 
investments, but also because the optimal financing policy requires the increase of the firm’s financial slack (see 
below).   Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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earnings-sensitivity  of  payout  decreases  with  the  voting  power  of  executive  directors 
(Hypothesis 2).  
The third major class of block holders is that of institutional investors (banks, insurance 
companies,  investment  funds,  unit  trusts,  pension  funds).  In  contrast  to  other  outside 
shareholders, there is evidence that UK institutional investors are not actively monitoring the 
companies they invest in (Lai and Sudarsanam, 1997; Franks et al., 2001; Faccio and Lasfer, 
2002). There are essentially two reasons for this lack of institutional shareholder activism. First, 
they do not usually have the resources to monitor the (many) firms in their portfolios. Second, 
monitoring  would  provide  institutions  with  inside  information  and  their  investments  would 
therefore  be locked  in.  Hence, in case of substantial agency  conflicts between managers and 
shareholders in a specific firm, institutions are more likely to sell (part of) their investment rather 
than to attempt to reduce agency conflicts by, for instance, imposing specific payout policies. 
Correia da Silva et  al. (2004)  report  that UK  institutions prefer high payout (in the form of 
dividends) for two reasons: (i) for some institutions, dividend payments are tax efficient
10 and (ii) 
high dividends facilitate the flow of funds from and to their investment portfolios. Considering 
the  institutions’  preference  for  dividends  (for  tax  reasons  as  well  as  for  asset  and  liability 
considerations), we expect that the earnings-sensitivity of payout strengthens with the voting 
power of financial institutions (Hypothesis 3).  
The  discussion  of  the  hypotheses  above  assumes  perfect  capital  markets  and, 
consequently,  the  independence  of  investment  and  financing  decisions.  Under  asymmetric 
information, however, the market requires – even for high quality firms/projects – a premium 
equal  to  the  one  required  for  investing  in  the  average  firm  (Myers  and  Majluf,  1984). 
Consequently, underinvestment problems may emerge: due to adverse selection, relatively lower 
quality projects may seek external financing whereas some of the positive NPV projects are not 
undertaken at all (Myers, 1984). A lack of internally generated funds or an excessively generous 
payout  policy  may  constrain  the  investment  expenditures  of  some  firms  (Goergen  and 
                                                 
10 See Bell and Jenkinson (2002) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) for a detailed discussion of tax treatment of various 
forms of payout in the UK.  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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Renneboog, 2001; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005), while the resulting suboptimal investment 
policy may harm the incumbent shareholders (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003).  
Apart  from  the  indirect  costs  discussed  above,  raising  external capital involves direct 
costs such as issuance costs. For instance, in case of seasoned equity offerings, the fees paid by 
issuing firms typically range between 1 and 10% of the value of the issue (Butler et al., 2003). 
Therefore, a policy of frequent refinancing requires a company to incur nontrivial costs of raising 
new capital (Myers, 1984). Moreover, even if there were no asymmetric information problems, 
additional funds cannot be raised immediately. Some investments are hardly deferrable and even 
a temporary lack of available resources may force a firm to forego an attractive project (Fama and 
French, 2002).  
Hence, if capital markets are imperfect, shareholders face an important tradeoff. They 
have to weigh the costs of overinvestment (type-I error, i.e. the projects that should not have been 
accepted are undertaken) against the possibility that a cash-constrained firm will not be able to 
undertake a profitable investment (type-II error). Enforcing a high payout policy mitigates the 
probability of type-I errors at a price of the higher likelihood of type-II errors in the investment 
policy. If the latter cost is substantial compared to the former one, outside shareholders may be 
better off when firms opt for relatively low payout ratios and finance their investment internally 
(Jensen et al., 1992). Thus, if a firm has strong shareholders (such as outside block holders or 
financial  institutions)  who  realize  that  a  firm  is  liquidity  constrained,  they  may  reduce  their 
demand for a high payout. This would attenuate Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
  As  the  choice  of  payout  policy  cannot  be  abstracted  from  the  firm’s  investment 
opportunities, we include Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities in our models. 
We control for firm size which is often considered as a proxy for firm maturity and has been 
shown to affect dividend policy (Grullon et al., 2002). Moreover, firms with more assets-in-place 
tend to have higher dividend payout ratios (Smith and Watts, 1992). 
Leverage may influence firms’ choices of payout policy because debt can also be used to 
alleviate potential free cash flow problems (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, some debt contracts include Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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protective  covenants  limiting  the  payout  a  firm  is  allowed  to  make  (in  order  to  prevent  the 
expropriation  of  bondholders  by  shareholders).  Therefore,  we  expect  a  negative  relationship 
between payout ratios and leverage.  
Industries differ with respect to maturity and information opacity (Zeckhauser and Pound, 
1990). Thus, the degree of free cash flow problems and, consequently, payout ratios are likely to 
vary considerably across sectors (Moh’d et al., 1995). Since our sample includes firms operating 
in  a  variety  of  sectors  (see  Section  3.1),  controlling  for  industry-specific  effects  assures  the 
reliability of the results. Finally, we also include year dummies to control for macroeconomic 
shocks (such as economy-wide cycles, etc.).  
3.  Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection, data sources and summary statistics 
Our sample covers UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange.  We exclude banks, 
insurance companies, and other financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6900) because their financial 
reporting standards are different from those of the rest of the sample. We also exclude utilities 
(SIC codes 4900-4949), because their payout policies and the access to external financing are 
regulated.  Finally,  we  only  retain  those  firms  that  are  present  in  the  Worldscope  Disclosure 
dataset for at least three years in the period 1992-1998. As a result, we are left with the sample of 
985 firms that covers more than two thirds of the UK listed non-financial firms and represents a 
broad range of industries.
11 We used the Worldscope database to gather ownership and control 
data as well as accounting data.  
  We  classify  shareholders  controlling  the  equity  blocks  into  6  mutually  exclusive 
categories:  (i)  executive  directors  and  their  families,  (ii)  non-executive  directors  and  their 
                                                 
11 The sample includes 206 agricultural, mining, forestry, fishing and construction firms (SIC codes 1-1999), 407 
manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000-3999), 204 retail and wholesale firms (SIC codes 5000-5999) and 168 service 
firms (SIC codes 7000-8999). Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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families, (iii) individuals and families not related to directors, (iv) the government,
12 (v) financial 
institutions  (i.e.  banks,  insurance  companies,  investment  and  pension  funds),  and  (vi)  other 
industrial and commercial companies. To classify the more than 5000 individual shareholders 
into the categories of executive/non-executive directors or of individuals/families not related to a 
director, we consult the London Stock Exchange Monitor and the Who’s Who-guides. To identify 
institutional shareholders, we consult Datastream and the Institutional Investors Annual Guides. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics.
13 All the data are expressed in constant 
1992 prices. The median amount spent yearly by the repurchasing firms on buying back their 
shares  equals  approximately  ￿ 0.8  million,  which  is  much  lower  than  the  median  dividend 
(￿ 1.4 million)  distributed  by  dividend-paying  firms.
14  The  median  size  of  the  total  payout 
(among  paying  firms)  amounts  to  ￿ 1.5  million.  Both  the  median  and  the  average  firm  are 
profitable: their earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) equal £ 4.2 million and £ 28.7 million, 
respectively. The market value of the average (median) firm equals £ 503 million (£ 73 million). 
The  mean  and  median  book  values  of  total  assets  equal  £  301  million  and  £  43  million, 
respectively. Because of the considerable skewness of those size measures, we employ logarithm 
of the book value of the total assets as a proxy for firm size. A typical firm is moderately levered 
– the average leverage ratios equal 59% in book-value terms and 40% in market-value terms. 
Finally,  the  sample  mean  and  median  values  of  Tobin’s  Q  proxy  equal  1.87  and  1.45, 
respectively. 
[ Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here ] 
                                                 
12 State ownership is rare: over all the firm-years, the government was a block holder in only 22 observations (related 
to 14 firms). The largest stake held by the State was 13.1%. Given the marginal nature of governmental ownership, 
we do not report this category of shareholders in subsequent sections.  
13 The control structure of the analyzed firms is discussed in Section 3.2.  
14 This result is at odds with the implications of the adverse selection models that predict that larger distributions 
should be made via the repurchase channel (e.g. Lucas and McDonald, 1998). However, while in the respective 
subsamples, median dividend is larger than median value of the repurchased equity in every single sample year, there 
are no substantial differences in average sizes of dividends (among dividend-paying firms) and repurchases (among 
repurchasing firms). Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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Table 2 shows that total payout as a fraction of earnings oscillates around 20-25% with 
the average  for the pooled sample equal to 22.75%. The corresponding number for dividend 
payout (20.28%), is only slightly lower.
15 Section 4 examines the impact of the control structure 
on those payout ratios.  
3.2. Ownership concentration and the measurement of voting power 
Panel A of Table 3 illustrates the distribution of equity blocks across different classes of 
shareholders. Financial institutions are the most important category of block holders. The average 
cumulative  stake  of  this  investor  group  approximately  equal  that  of  all  other block holdings 
combined. In an average company, institutional block holders control about one fifth of the total 
equity outstanding. Table 3 also shows that in the average sample firm, executive directors hold a 
non-negligible fraction of the equity outstanding, namely 10%, by means of share blocks of at 
least 5%. Averaging the block holdings controlled by industrial firms, we find a considerably 
smaller  stake  (of  about  4%).  Equity  blocks  held  by  other  groups  of  owners  (non-executive 
directors or  outside individuals) are typically smaller. In addition to the dispersion of blocks 
across various types of shareholders, Table 3 analyses also ownership concentration per se (see 
Panel  B).  The  average  sizes  of  the  largest,  2
nd  largest,  and  3
rd  largest  blocks  equal  17.23%, 
7.33%, and 4.04% of the equity outstanding, respectively.  
[ Insert Table 3 about here ] 
As one of the focal points of this paper is the relation between payout policy and the 
control power of specific types of shareholders, we construct various measures of voting control. 
We follow the Crespi and Renneboog (2003) approach and analyze a two-stage voting game. We 
assume  that  in  the  first  stage,  all  the  shareholders  of  a  particular  type  (e.g.  all  financial 
institutions) form a coalition. Only in the second stage, such coalitions participate in a voting 
                                                 
15 This number should be contrasted with the payout ratio based on repurchases only. In the analyzed period, only a 
tiny  fraction  of  aggregate  firm  earnings  (on  average  2.33%)  was  distributed  to  shareholders  via  share  buyback 
programs. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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game with the intention to influence (or even to determine) the payout policy. Several arguments 
can  be  invoked  to  justify  such  an  approach.  Different  categories  of  shareholders  may  have 
different incentives or abilities to monitor the firm such that it may be easier to create coalitions 
with shareholders of the same type. For example, given that executive directors enjoy similar 
private  benefits  of  control,  they  may  combine  their  shareholdings  into  one  voting  block  to 
safeguard their discretion on managerial decisions. Moreover, the two-stage approach advocated 
here seems relevant in the context of payout decisions due to the existence of different clienteles. 
For instance, it is not unlikely that institutions collectively signal to the firm’s management their 
preference for a specific payout policy (e.g. regular dividends every year due to asset-liability 
management considerations).
16  
The measurement of voting power is the topic of an ongoing debate in game theory and 
corporate finance (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998; Leech, 2002). Examples of measures used in 
the  literature  include  Banzhaf  indices  (Banzhaf,  1965;  Dubey  and  Shapley,  1979),  different 
versions  of  Shapley  values  (Shapley  and  Shubik,  1954;  Milnor  and  Shapley,  1978),  and 
contestability indices (Bloch and Hege, 2001). Despite the recent popularity of Shapley values in 
empirical  corporate  finance  research  (e.g.  Eckbo  and  Verma,  1994;  Crespi  and  Renneboog, 
2003), Leech (2002) argues that the underlying notion of power (i.e. P-power, or power as the 
prize in a voting game) appears inappropriate in the analysis of shareholder voting behavior. 
Instead,  he  argues  that  shareholder  voting  games  can  be  better  described  by  policy-seeking 
motives  (rather  than  office-seeking  motive  implicit  in  Shapley  values)  such  that  I-power
17 
                                                 
16 Furthermore, the casting of votes by institutions has been on the rise, although it is a relatively recent phenomenon 
(since the second half of the 1990s). Surveys reveal that many UK institutions have established voting policies. The 
PIRC (1999) survey on institutional voting trends concludes that overall proxy voting levels have increased to over 
50%. These observations and the fact that institutional investors regularly meet through the national associations 
(like i.e., the National Association of Pension Funds), may justify the calculation of voting measures for accumulated 
share  blocks  as  if  bank  managed  funds,  of  investment  and  pension  funds  and  of  funds  managed  by  insurance 
companies were forming coalitions. 
17 According to this notion, power is defined as the ability to influence the decision (i.e. the outcome of the vote), but 
it is not interpreted as the prize in a voting game (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998).   Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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measures  are  more  relevant  in  such  a  context.  This  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  study  that 
analyzes payout choices, which, by their very nature, have the character of a policy decision. 
The most frequently used measure of voting power for such (policy) games are Banzhaf 
(1965) values (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). A Banzhaf absolute value for a particular player 
is defined as the probability that - in a randomly chosen bisection of a set of game participants - 
the vote outcome changes if this particular player switches the coalitions.
18 The analyzed game 
can be considered an oceanic one. In game theory, oceanic games involve a few relatively large 
players and a continuum of infinitesimal players (Milnor and Shapley, 1978). Most of the UK 
companies have a few block holders, while the remaining shareholdings are widely dispersed. 
Hence, we consider an oceanic representation to approximate the actual distribution of votes.  
Therefore, we employ the generalization of Banzhaf values as proposed by Dubey and Shapley 
(1979).
19   
The  naïve  approach  -  often  followed  in  the  corporate  finance  literature  –  consists  of 
including the size of the equity stakes controlled by different block holders into the empirical 
models. Those stakes are only a crude proxy for the strength of a particular investor and the main 
problem is that the stakes controlled by other shareholders (and hence the relative control power) 
are ignored. For instance, a block representing 20% of the votes in a company with otherwise 
widely dispersed ownership is likely to yield effective control over the company (Crama et al., 
2003).  A  block  of  25%  in  a  company  with  a  majority  shareholder  may  not  give  its  holder 
significant influence (apart from the advantage of possessing a blocking minority). Hence, it is 
the relative rather than the absolute voting power of a given investor, which determines his ability 
                                                 
18The indices we employ are often referred to as absolute Banzhaf indices (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). Relative 
indices are obtained by normalizing the absolute ones. As a result of this normalization, relative Banzhaf indices for 
a game sum up to 1. We briefly discuss the models employing relative indices in our robustness checks (see Section 
5.2). An example of a Banzhaf index calculation is given in the Appendix.  
19 Under some regularity conditions, Banzhaf indices in an oceanic game can be obtained as the Banzhaf indices for 
the  modified,  finite  game  consisting  only  of  the  major  players  with  an  appropriate  adjustment  of  the  required 
majority threshold (Dubey and Shapley, 1979). Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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to  influence  the  firm’s  policies  (Crespi  and  Renneboog,  2003).  Consequently,  we  invoke  a 
solution resulting from game-theoretical approach. 
Table 4 shows the absolute Banzhaf indices and confirms the considerable potential of 
financial  institutions  and  executive  directors  to  influence  corporate  policies  (see  Panel  A).
20 
Despite the relatively small size of the largest block (on average 17.23%, see Table 3), the voting 
power of its holder is substantial (compared to the power of other block holders): on average, the 
absolute index for the largest shareholder exceeds 0.5 (see Panel B of Table 4). 
[ Insert Table 4 about here ] 
3.3. Model specifications and estimation techniques  
In order to analyze the dynamics of payout policy, we extend the partial-adjustment model 
proposed by Lintner (1956). The model assumes that all that companies maintain a target payout 
ratio and that the shocks in earnings are reflected in payout changes over the number of years 
after they actually occur. This gradual adjustment feature is with the widely observed practice of 
dividend smoothing (Allen and Michaely, 2003). We use partial-adjustment models to explain not 
only the dividends, but also the total payout. The basic specification is given by: 
(1)  it t i it i t i it D E D D e b b a + × + × + = - - - ) 1 ( 2 1 ) 1 ( , 
where Dit denotes a payout (dividends or total payout) made by i-th company in year t. Eit denotes 
earnings (EBIT) of i-th company in year t. ai is the firm-specific effect, b1 and b2 are model 
parameters, and eit is the error term. In this model, the target payout is related to earnings (Eit) via 
                                                 
20 In our empirical setting, we distinguish five categories of shareholders and compute the measures of voting power 
for each of those categories. Although Hypotheses 1 and 3 predict that the presence of blocks controlled by industrial 
firms, outside individuals, or financial institutions has a positive effect on payout ratios, we do not find a convincing 
a  priori  argument  why  this  effect  should  be  of  the  same  magnitude  for  all  those  groups  of  shareholders.  The 
heterogeneity may stem from differing investment motives, investment horizons, tax preferences, monitoring skills, 
etc. Therefore, in the regression models discussed in Section 4, we include Banzhaf measures for all five categories 
of block holders. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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. The immediate adjustment of actual payout to the earnings 
shock is only partial with the speed of adjustment is given by –b2.  
In order to test our hypotheses pertaining to the impact of ownership structure variables 
on payout ratios, we extend the specification outlined by Equation 1 by including as regressors k 
interactions of the ownership variables (e.g. Banzhaf indices for executive directors and financial 
institutions)  with  the  earnings  differential.  We  also  include  a  vector  of  additional  regressors 
(denoted by  Xit) such as  e.g. industry dummies. Thus,  the regression equation describing the 
extended full-adjustment model can be written as: 
(2)  it it
k
j




, ) 1 ( 2 1 ) 1 ( . 
Ownj,it is the value of j-th ownership variable for i-th firm in year t. l’s and the vector g are model 
parameters. Since we expect the ownership variables to have an effect on target payout ratios (see 
Section 2), we hypothesize that l’s are significantly different from zero. Our hypotheses do not 
impose any restrictions on the other model parameters. 
Finally, we re-arrange the terms in the equation above and estimate the following model 
in Section 4: 
(3)  it it
k
j




, ) 1 ( 2 1 ) 1 ( . 
Partial-adjustment  specifications  are  dynamic  panel  data  models  with  the  lagged 
dependent  variable  as  a  regressor.  Hence,  traditional  estimators,  such  as  fixed-effect  within-
estimators, are biased (Baltagi, 2001). This bias is the most severe when the time dimension of 
the panel is relatively small (as it is the case in our study). The inferences based on such estimates 
are likely to lead to spurious conclusions. This may be one of the main reasons for the differences 
in results between our paper and some other studies (e.g. Moh’d et al., 1995; Short et al., 2002). 
The more appropriate methodological approach is a dynamic panel data estimation technique. 
Several  (mostly  GMM-type)  estimators  have  been  proposed  in  the  literature  to  address  this 
problem (Baltagi, 2001). The simplest estimator is based on a first-differenced equation where Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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the differences are instrumented by lagged levels of the regressors (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
However, such an estimator has been found to have large finite sample bias and poor precision in 
simulation studies (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This problem appears most acute in dynamic panel 
data models where the autoregressive parameter is moderately large and the time dimension of 
the panel is relatively small. Most of the payout studies are likely to suffer from at least one of 
those problems. For instance, payout levels are relatively persistent, since most of the companies 
are reluctant to alter dramatically their dividend policy from year to year (Allen and Michaely, 
2003). Furthermore, the efficiency problem stems from the fact that lagged levels of the series are 
weak instruments for the first differences. The Blundell and Bond (1998) approach extends the 
linear  Arellano and  Bond (1991) GMM-procedure. More specifically, the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) estimation technique employs lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments 
for equations in levels (in addition to using levels as instruments for the differences). Blundell 
and Bond (1998) demonstrate that there are substantial efficiency gains resulting from the use of 
their system GMM estimator as compared to other dynamic panel data estimators.  
We  apply  the  GMM-in-systems  estimator  developed  by  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  to 
obtain the results for partial-adjustment models (Equation 3). DPD for Ox software is employed 
to estimate those models. Following Doornik et al. (2002), we use up to two lagged levels of the 
regressors  as  the  instruments  in  the  first-differenced  equation  (rather  than  using  all  the  lags 
available)  because  remote  lagged  levels  are  likely  to  be  weak  instruments  for  the  first 
differences.
21  
The estimates reported in Section 4 are the output of a two-step optimization procedure 
(Doornik  et  al.,  2002).  We  employ  Sargan  test  for  overidentifying  restrictions  to  assess  the 
validity  of  the  imposed  moment  conditions.  A  robust  covariance  matrix  of  the  estimators  is 
employed in all the reported models to account for potential heteroscedasticity. Additionally, we 
                                                 
21 We experimented with other lag structures as well (e.g. using up to 3 or all available lags as instruments). The 
parameter estimates (as well as the confidence intervals) are very close to the ones reported in the text. However, the 
specifications  with  more  lags  require  a  larger  number  of  moment  restrictions  to  be  satisfied,  which  affects  the 
outcomes of the Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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report the results of the autoregressive (AR) tests for residuals. These tests allow us to check for 
potential higher-order dependence in partial-adjustment models.  
4. Dynamics of payout-profitability relationship  
  Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results for partial-adjustment models explaining the 
dynamics of dividends and of the total payout, respectively. In each table, the first model reported 
corresponds  to  the  basic  specification  (without  variables  characterizing  firms’  ownership 
structure),  while  the  other  two  regressions  are  the  extended  specifications  as  described  by 
Equation 3.  
[ Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here ]  
For the basic dividend model (Model 1 in Table 5), the Sargan test indicates that (at the 
conventional 5% significance level) the reported estimates fail to match the moment conditions 
imposed by the GMM-based Blundell and Bond (1998) procedure. Hence, we do not interpret the 
corresponding  estimation  results  and  report  them  for  reasons  of  comparison  only.  The  basic 
model for the total payout (Model 3 in Table 6) passes the Sargan test, but it does not describe the 
dynamics of the dependent variable satisfactorily. As to the t-statistics, only the lagged payout 
variable  is  significant  at  5%  level,  which  suggests  path-dependence  in  payout  policies. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient corresponding to the earnings falls short of statistical significance, 
though it is positive as expected.  
The  partial-adjustment  models  including  the  ownership  variables  (Models  2  and  4) 
perform considerably better in statistical terms and capture the dynamics of dividends and total 
payout reasonably well (with realistic implied payout ratios). For instance, Model 2 implies that 
for a widely held firm (i.e. for a firm where the measures of voting power for all block holders’ 
coalitions take a value of zero), the target dividend payout ratio equals 31.9% (i.e.  27 . 0 1
23 . 0
- ; see 
Section  3.3),  which  exceeds  the  sample  average  (i.e.  20.3%;  see  Table  2).  The  same  model 
implies that in a firm controlled by financial institutions (i.e. a firm where Banzhaf measure for 
this group of investors equals one, while voting power of other coalitions is zero), the target Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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dividend payout ratio is much lower and amounts to 14.3% only. With regard to the total payout 
policy, the results imply that the corresponding numbers for the total payout ratio equal 27.3% for 
a widely-held firm and 15.6% for a firm controlled by financial institutions. These implied payout 
ratios are reasonably close to the observed average (i.e. 22.8%). 
Changes  in  earnings  translate  only  gradually  into  (dividend)  payout  adjustments.  The 
coefficients  for  the  lagged  dividends  and  lagged  total  payout  are  significant  in  the  models 
reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Therefore, the models seem to be consistent not only 
with ‘dividend smoothing’, but also – more generally – with ‘payout smoothing’. 
The estimates of the coefficients corresponding to the interactions between profitability 
and the power of industrial firms as well as between profitability and the power of individual 
block holders are negative and at least marginally significant in the models reported in Tables 5 
and 6. Hence, contrary to which was predicted by Hypothesis 1, outside shareholders seem to 
prefer relatively low payout ratios and to approve shielding of payout from earnings shocks. This 
result  is  consistent  with  the  implications  of  the  financial  constraints  model  (see  Section  2). 
Apparently, large outside shareholders acknowledge the potential cost of underinvestment and 
allow firms to extend their financial slack. At the same time, as those shareholders are likely to 
actively  monitor  the  management  (see  Section  2),  they  can  curb  potential  overinvestment 
problems in firms with substantial free cash flow.     
As predicted by Hypothesis 2, the interaction of earnings and the voting power enjoyed by 
executive directors is significantly negative in Model 2.
22 Apparently, strong managers are able to 
weaken  the  positive  link  between  corporate  profitability  and  dividend  payout.  The  values  of 
estimates  imply  that  in  firms  where  executive  directors  constitute  a  controlling  block  holder 
                                                 
22 The corresponding coefficient is also negative in Model 4 that explains the dynamics of total payout (see Table 6), 
though it falls short of statistical significance. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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coalition (with corresponding Banzhaf indices equal to 1), the implied payout ratio is less than a 
half the payout ratio of a widely held firm.
23   
As indicated by Model 2 (in Table 5) the dividend payout ratio tends to be significantly 
lower  in firms  with dominating financial  institutions than in widely-held  firms (although the 
corresponding coefficients in the total payout models are not statistically significant; see Table 6). 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  the  tax  preference  for  dividends  by  financial  institutions  does  not 
dominate  the  payout  decision;  it  seems  that  this  type  of  block  holders  realizes  the  costs  of 
excessive payout and is ready to mitigate their demand for a high dividend payout (in spite of its 
tax advantages).
24 Consequently, the evidence fails to support Hypothesis 3.  
Models 1-4 also illustrate the impact of other firm characteristics on the dynamics of 
payout.  In  line  with  our  earlier  expectations,  larger  firms  distribute  more  funds  to  their 
shareholders than small firms do. Unexpectedly, the firms’ investment opportunities seem not to 
matter for the payout decisions as the impact of the Tobin’s Q proxy appears insignificant in any 
of the models reported in Tables 5 and 6. Finally, payout decisions and leverage are significantly 
related. Still, the positive sign of the effect of this variable is a bit puzzling: apparently, more 
levered firms maintain higher payout ratios than less levered firm.   
5. Extensions and robustness checks  
5.1. One-stage voting game 
The theoretical considerations summarized in Section 2 imply that the preferences with 
respect to the payout policy differ by type of shareholder. However, our empirical results do not 
support such a prediction. In relation to the corporate earnings distribution policy, block holders 
appear  to  behave  similarly  (at  least,  from  a  qualitative  point  of  view)  irrespectively  of  their 
                                                 
23 Notably, a similar (yet stronger) effect can be observed for the power of non-executive directors. Substantial 
voting power of this group of shareholders significantly weakens the earnings-sensitivity of payout. The magnitude 
of this effect is comparable to that for outside block holders (see above). 
24 Importantly, the fact that block holders prefer payout not to be sensitive to earning changes does not necessarily 
imply that this payout should be as low as zero (cf. Trojanowski, 2004). The results suggest that block holders 
(irrespectively of their type) are pleased with a stable payout policy (not affected by short-run earnings shocks). Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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identity.  This  finding  may  suggest  that  our  two-stage  approach  to  the  voting  game  may  be 
incorrect. Rather than forming type-based coalitions first, and participating in the voting game 
only afterwards, block holders may attempt to achieve their payout policy goals on their own. In 
the models summarized in Table 7 below, we verify such a claim empirically. We consider a one-
stage oceanic voting game, where each block holder is treated as a separate player. Then, we 
compute the corresponding Banzhaf indices to measure block holders’ voting power. We employ 
those  measures  and  re-estimate  partial-adjustment  models  for  the  dividends  and  for the total 
payout.    
[ Insert Table 7 about here ]  
In Models 5 and 6 (see Table 7), we include the measures of voting power for the two 
largest  block  holders.
25  The  results  obtained  here  demonstrate  the  pattern  similar  to  those 
obtained earlier for block holder coalitions. The presence of a large shareholder considerably 
decreases the implied payout ratios, in particular when dividends are considered.
26 For instance, 
Model 5 implies a dividend payout ratio of 32.2% for a widely-held firm, while for a firm with 
median control concentration the corresponding number amounts to merely 18.5%. The direction 
of  the  effect  is  the  same  for  both  the  largest  and  the  second  largest  shareholder,  which 
distinguishes our results from those obtained by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) for Germany.
27 In 
contrast to the German firms most of which are dominated by one shareholder with an absolute 
voting majority, the overwhelming majority of our sample firms are minority-controlled: only 
about 6% of the companies analyzed here have a majority owner. Consequently, it is difficult to 
compare  our  qualitative  results  with  those  obtained  by  Gugler  and  Yurtoglu  (2003), as  their 
conclusions are largely based on the comparisons of two types of majority-controlled firms and a 
                                                 
25  We  estimated  the  models  where  we  considered  also  the  power  of  the  third  largest  shareholder,  but  the 
corresponding coefficients for the interactions of Banzhaf indices with the earnings proved insignificant. 
26 Moreover, it appears that it is not just the most powerful shareholder who tries to impose a specific payout policy. 
In a typical company, a coalition of at least two leading shareholders influences the choice of the payout ratio. 
27 In their study, the control power of the largest equity holder reduces the dividend payout ratio whereas the control 
power of the second largest shareholder increases the payout. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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group of  companies without a majority block holder. In our paper, we apply a more refined 
measure of block holders’ power and we document that within minority-controlled firms, a strong 
relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  chosen  payout  policies  can  be  observed.
28 
Finally, Models 5 and 6 support the earlier results pertaining to the impact of the other firm 
characteristics on payout. Payout is higher in larger and more levered firms, while Tobin’s Q 
proxy does not appear to affect the amount of funds that are distributed to shareholders. 
5.2. Other extensions and robustness checks  
We tried several model specifications alternative to those reported in the text. First, we 
verified whether the partial-adjustment mechanism implied by the Lintner (1956) model captures 
the  payout  dynamics  well.  We  checked  two  alternative  types  of  specification:  Waud  models 
(1966) and full-adjustment models (cf. Short et al., 2002).
29 As the data clearly indicate that 
payout  adjusts  to  earnings  shocks  only  gradually,  full-adjustment  models  appear  clearly 
misspecified. There is no support for a complicated adjustment mechanism implied by the Waud 
model  either.  Hence,  the  partial-adjustment  specification  is  a  clear  winner  of  this  horse-race 
exercise.  Second, we verified whether the payout adjustment to earning changes is symmetric for 
positive and negative shocks to profitability. Following Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), we allowed 
for adjustment of payout to earning changes to be asymmetric, but the models obtained were 
strongly rejected.  
Third, we tried alternative proxies for some of the variables. For instance, rather than 
employing leverage, we estimated the models that incorporate interest coverage as a regressor. 
Since  high  interest  obligations  may  reduce  the  amount  of  funds  available  for  payout  to 
shareholders, we expect the parameter corresponding to this variable to be negative. We do not 
find the support for such a claim, since the estimate is insignificant while the remaining results 
remain similar to those reported. Finally, we re-estimated Models 2, 4, and 6 reported in the text 
                                                 
28 In the robustness checks (not reported), we find that the results of the paper are not driven by observations on firms 
that have a majority shareholder. 
29 The corresponding estimation results are available upon request.  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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with alternative proxies for the voting power; the models employing relative Banzhaf indices 
instead of the absolute ones render the results that are virtually identical to those reported in the 
text.    
6. Conclusions 
We analyze a large panel of UK firms for the 1990s and find that the payout policy is 
significantly  related  to  control  concentration.  The  application  of  the  state-of-the-art  dynamic 
panel data estimation procedure allows us to avoid biases plaguing many empirical studies of 
corporate payout. Our analysis of payout dynamics reveals that companies adjust payout policies 
to  earnings  changes  only  gradually,  which  is  consistent  with  the  ‘dividend  smoothing’ 
documented  in  the  literature.  In  fact,  our  results  suggest  a  presence  of  a  more  general 
phenomenon of the ‘total payout smoothing’. 
Profitability indeed drives payout decisions of the analyzed companies, but the presence 
of strong block holders or block holder coalitions weakens the relationship between the corporate 
earnings and the payout dynamics. This paper also contributes to the methodological debate on 
the measurement of voting power. We advocate the use of Banzhaf indices as a relevant measure 
of voting power in analyses of corporate policy choices. According to our best knowledge, it is 
the first study employing those game theory-based concepts in the context of corporate payout 
policies.  
The reduced earnings sensitivity of dividends in the presence of control concentration 
suggests that controlling shareholders trade off the agency costs of free cash flow against the risk 
of  underinvestment.  Strong  block  holders  (or  a  block  holder  coalition)  mitigate  the  agency 
conflict between management and shareholders and, consequently, render the internal sources of 
financing attractive. At the same time, block holders appear to realize that overly generous payout 
may  render  the  company  to  be  liquidity  constrained,  and,  consequently,  result  in  suboptimal 
investment policy. Thus, the results challenge some of the implications of the agency theories of 
payout, and favor a pecking-order explanation for the observed patterns. While the impact of the 
voting power of shareholders’ coalitions on payout ratios is found to be always negative, the Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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magnitude of this effect differs across different categories of block holders (i.e. industrial firms, 
outside individuals, directors, financial institutions). In particular, industrial firms and outside 
individuals are those groups of block holders that appear most likely to restrain their demand for 
high payout.  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics.  
Variable  Mean  Median  St. dev. 
Amount spent on dividends by dividend-paying firms  10218  1449  44271 
Amount spent on share repurchases by repurchasing firms  15989  799  62858 
Average amount paid out by firms reimbursing the funds  11318  1502  49575 
Earnings   28720  4209  160391 
Market value of the firm (in £ thousands)  503325  72755  2476283 
Book value of the total assets (in £ thousands)   301153  43468  1445710 
Firm size (log of the book value of the total assets)  4.7214  4.6382  0.7166 
Leverage (in book value terms)  0.5856  0.5541  0.3597 
Leverage (in market value terms)  0.3978  0.3728  0.2069 
Tobin’s Q  1.8724  1.4505  1.8410 
Note to Table 1: All numbers are expressed in constant 1992 prices. The descriptive statistics for the amounts paid 
are conditional on the particular type of payout being employed as an earnings distribution channel. All the numbers 
are expressed in £ thousands. The remaining summary statistics are computed for the full sample of 5547 firm-years. 
Earnings are defined as EBIT in a particular year and are expressed in £ thousands. The market value of the firm is 
expressed in £ thousands and defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt at the end 
of a given year. Firm size is defined as a natural logarithm of the book value of the total assets (expressed in £ 
thousands). Leverage in book value terms is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of the total assets and 
is measured at the end of the year. Leverage in market value terms is defined as the ratio of total debt to the market 
value of the firm and is measured at the end of the year. Tobin’s Q proxy is defined as the ratio of the market value 
of the firm to the book value of the total assets. 
 
 
Table 2. Earning payout ratios: average values.  
Year  Payout as a fraction of EBIT  Payout as a fraction of EBIT (if EBIT >0) 
  Repurchases  Dividends  Total payout  Repurchases  Dividends  Total payout 
1992  1.00 %  28.07 %  29.19 %  1.78 %  38.54 %  40.32 % 
1993  4.69 %  21.07 %  25.81 %  5.89 %  31.17 %  37.11 % 
1994  2.92 %  26.22 %  29.23 %  3.40 %  32.21 %  35.75 % 
1995  1.23 %  20.90 %  22.22 %  1.44 %  34.84 %  36.44 % 
1996  2.11 %  21.93 %  24.29 %  2.53 %  36.22 %  39.18 % 
1997  2.09 %  7.42 %  9.52 %  3.28 %  30.27 %  33.75 % 
1998  2.41 %  11.64 %  14.19 %  2.83 %  36.79 %  40.47 % 
Total  2.33 %  20.28 %  22.75 %  3.02 %  33.92 %  37.13 % 
Note to Table 2: The last row presents the statistics for the pooled sample. 
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Table 3. Distribution of equity blocks. 
Variable  Mean  Median  St. dev. 
Panel A: Distribution of equity blocks across different classes of shareholders  
Executive directors  0.1000  0.0000  0.1740 
Financial institutions  0.1899  0.1615  0.1670 
Industrial firms  0.0405  0.0000  0.1132 
Non-executive directors  0.0167  0.0000  0.0608 
Outside individuals  0.0231  0.0000  0.0649 
Panel B: Sizes of the largest blocks  
     
Largest block  0.1723  0.1358  0.1586 
2
nd largest block  0.0733  0.0740  0.0640 
3
rd largest block  0.0404  0.0500  0.0437 
Note to Table 3: Summary statistics are computed for the pooled sample of 5547 firm-years. 
   
 
Table 4. Voting power of the largest block holders. 
Variable  Mean  Median  St. dev. 
Panel A: Two-stage voting game (voting power measures for shareholder coalitions) 
Absolute Banzhaf indices 
     
Executive directors  0.2199  0.0000  0.3979 
Financial institutions  0.5766  1.0000  0.4793 
Industrial firms  0.0904  0.0000  0.2761 
Non-executive directors  0.0378  0.0000  0.1706 
Outside individuals  0.0508  0.0000  0.1966 
Panel B: One-stage voting game (voting power measures for the largest shareholders) 
Absolute Banzhaf indices 
     
Largest block  0.6486  0.7500  0.3754 
2
nd largest block  0.1432  0.0000  0.1948 
3
rd largest block  0.1337  0.0000  0.1843 
Note to Table 4: Summary statistics are computed for the pooled sample of 5547 firm-years. Construction of the 
Banzhaf indices is explained in Section 3.2. 
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Table 5. Partial-adjustment models explaining dividend dynamics.  
 
 
Model 1  Model 2 
Voting power measure applied  None  Banzhaf absolute index 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic 
Lagged dividend  0.31  2.19
*    0.27  1.86
†    
Earnings  0.09  3.51
***  0.23   4.12
*** 
Firm size * 1000  15.93  2.25
*    13.75  2.19
*    
Tobin’s Q proxy * 1000  0.43  1.64      0.31  1.24      
Leverage * 1000  6.51      2.12
*    6.65  1.92
†     
Earnings * Voting power of industrial firms      -0.21  -2.62
** 
Earnings * Voting power of outside individuals      -0.25  -1.96
*  
Earnings * Voting power of non-executive directors      -0.16  -2.01
*  
Earnings * Voting power of executive directors      -0.14  -2.13
*  
Earnings * Voting power of financial institutions      -0.13  -3.12
** 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  4435  4435 
No. of firms  928  928 










AR(1) test z-statistic  -1.71
†  -1.72
† 
AR(2) test z-statistic    0.55    0.99 




*** denote significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1% confidence level, respectively. Robust 
covariance matrix estimator is used to compute the t-statistics reported. Wald statistics are computed to verify joint 
significance of the model variables (other than year and industry dummies). The Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions verifies the appropriateness of moment conditions imposed in the estimation procedure. AR-test statistics 
asymptotically  have  a  standard  normal  distribution.  Year  dummies  determine the  constant.  All the  numbers  are 
expressed  in  constant  1992  prices.  Dividends are  expressed in £ thousands. Earnings are defined as EBIT in a 
particular year and are expressed in £ thousands. Firm size is defined as a natural logarithm of the book value of the 
total assets (expressed in £ thousands). Leverage is expressed in book value terms. It is defined as the ratio of total 
debt to the book value of the total assets and is measured at the end of the year. Tobin’s Q proxy is defined as the 
ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of the total assets. Construction of the voting power measures 
(Banzhaf values) is explained in Section 3.2.  Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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Table 6. Partial-adjustment models explaining the dynamics of the total payout. 
 
 
Model 3  Model 4 
Voting power measure applied  None  Banzhaf absolute index 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic 
Lagged payout  0.37  2.87
**  0.30  2.79
** 
Earnings  0.06  1.61     0.19  2.59
** 
Firm size * 1000  17.54  1.39     19.43  2.46
*  
Tobin’s Q proxy * 1000  0.78  1.55     0.65  1.48 
   
Leverage * 1000  7.26  1.38     10.48  2.06
*  
Earnings * Voting power of industrial firms      -0.29  -2.42
*  
Earnings * Voting power of outside individuals      -0.26  -1.69
†  
Earnings * Voting power of non-executive directors      -0.16  -1.71
†  
Earnings * Voting power of executive directors      -0.10  -1.33 
   
Earnings * Voting power of financial institutions      -0.08  -1.28 
   
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  4394  4394 
No. of firms  918  918 





Sargan test   c
2(69) = 75.40  c
2(139) = 157.40 
AR(1) test z-statistic  -2.07
*  -2.03
* 
AR(2) test z-statistic    1.58    1.56 




*** denote significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1% confidence level, respectively. Robust 
covariance matrix estimator is used to compute the t-statistics reported. Wald statistics are computed to verify joint 
significance of the model variables (other than year and industry dummies). The Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions verifies the appropriateness of moment conditions imposed in the estimation procedure. AR-test statistics 
asymptotically  have  a  standard  normal  distribution.  Year  dummies  determine the  constant.  All the  numbers  are 
expressed in constant 1992 prices. Total payouts are expressed in £ thousands. Earnings are defined as EBIT in a 
particular year and are expressed in £ thousands. Firm size is defined as a natural logarithm of the book value of the 
total assets (expressed in £ thousands). Leverage is expressed in book value terms. It is defined as the ratio of total 
debt to the book value of the total assets and is measured at the end of the year. Tobin’s Q proxy is defined as the 
ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of the total assets. Construction of the voting power measures 
(Banzhaf values) is explained in Section 3.2. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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Table 7. Partial-adjustment models explaining dividend dynamics and total payout dynamics. 
 
 
Model 5  Model 6 
Dependent variable  Dividend payout  Total payout 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic 
Lagged dividend  0.30  2.12
*  
    
 
Lagged payout      0.33  3.02
** 
Earnings  0.23  3.70
***  0.19  2.52
*  
Firm size * 1000  12.40  1.99
*  
   16.58  1.97
* 
 
Tobin’s Q proxy * 1000  0.29  1.41      0.60  1.49    
Leverage * 1000  5.86  1.93
†  
   6.40  1.78
†   
Earnings * Voting power of the largest shareholder  -0.13  -2.83
**   -0.09  -1.32    
Earnings * Voting power of the 2
nd largest shareholder  -0.21  -2.49
*     -0.14  -1.02    
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  4435  4394 
No. of firms  928  918 





Sargan test   c
2(97) = 118.70
†  c
2(97) = 108.40 
AR(1) test z-statistic  -1.65
†  -2.00
* 
AR(2) test z-statistic   1.00  -1.55  




*** denote significance at 10, 5, 1, and 0.1% confidence level, respectively. Robust 
covariance matrix estimator is used to compute the t-statistics reported. Wald statistics are computed to verify joint 
significance of the model variables (other than year and industry dummies). The Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions verifies the appropriateness of moment conditions imposed in the estimation procedure. AR-test statistics 
asymptotically have a standard normal distribution. Year dummies determine the constant. The construction of the 
voting power measures (Banzhaf values) is outlined in Section 3.2 (see Table 4). Other variables are defined in the 
same way as those used in the models reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
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Appendix: Computation of Banzhaf values – an example 
This example illustrates the computation of the Banzhaf absolute and relative indices. 
Consider  a  company  where  a  simple  majority  voting  rule  holds  and  where  four  large  block 
holders own 21, 12, 10, and 7 per cent of the outstanding equity, respectively. Henceforth we will 
refer  to  these  block  holders  as  a, b,  c, and d. The remaining shares  (i.e.  50% of the equity 
outstanding) are widely held. Thus, we consider an oceanic representation to approximate the 
actual distribution of  votes and employ  the  generalization of Banzhaf  values  as proposed by 
Dubey and Shapley (1979).
30 
As explained in Section 3.2, the first stage in calculations involves rescaling of all the 
block holdings so they sum up to 100%. In the analyzed example, it can simply be done by 
multiplying the sizes of the blocks by two, i.e. the rescaled stakes of shareholders a, b, c, and d 
equal 42, 24, 20, and 14 per cent, respectively. Second, the adjustment of the majority threshold 
(see footnote 19) means that in order to approve a proposal, at least 50% of votes cast by block 
holders should be in favor of such a proposal.   
In order to compute Banzhaf indices, all the bisections of the set of players  { } d c b a , , ,  
have to be considered. There exist eight such bisections as illustrated in Table A1 below.
31 The 
right-hand side of the table illustrates that the decision by player a to switch coalitions reverses 
the outcome of the vote in six cases (out of eight possible ones). Thus, according to the definition, 
the  absolute  Banzhaf  index  describing  the  voting  power  of  block  holder  a  equals  to  . 4
3
8
6 =  
Banzhaf indices for block holders b, c, and d can be computed in a similar manner. For each of 
these block holders, their decision to switch coalitions reverses the outcome of the vote in two out 
of eight cases. Consequently, the corresponding index values equal to  . 4
1
8
2 =   
[ Insert Table A1 about here ] 
                                                 
30 Technically, we assume that those shares are held by a continuum of infinitesimal players. 
31 More precisely, in addition to eight cases analyzed in Table A1, eight additional cases exist. They are, however, 
symmetrical to those outlined in the table. For instance, the case where all the block holders vote ‘Yes’ and none of 
them votes ‘No’ is symmetrical to Bisection 1 shown in the table. Thus, it is sufficient to analyze Bisections 1-8 to 
compute Banzhaf indices. Control Structures and Payout Policy  
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Relative Banzhaf indices can be obtained by rescaling the absolute values, so they sum up 
to one. The sum of the absolute Banzhaf indices equal to  2







3 + + + ). The relative 
Banzhaf indices can therefore be obtained by multiplying the values of absolute indices by  . 3
2  
Thus, the relative Banhaf indices for players a, b, c, and d equal  2
1 ,  6
1 ,  6
1 , and  6
1 , respectively. 
Table A1. Computation of Banzhaf absolute values. 
  Bisection 
Suppose one of the block holders 
changed the coalition. Would the 
outcome of the vote change if such a 
switch was made by block holder 
No.  Voting ‘Yes’  Voting ‘No’ 
Voting 
outcome 
a?  b?  c?  d? 
1  Æ  { } d c b a , , ,   ‘No’  –  –  –  – 
2  { } a   { } d c b , ,   ‘No’  –  +  +  + 
3  { } b   { } d c a , ,   ‘No’  +  –   –  – 
4  { } c   { } d b a , ,   ‘No’  +  –  –  – 
5  { } d   { } c b a , ,   ‘No’  +  –  –  – 
6  { } b a,   { } d c,   ‘Yes’  +  +  –  – 
7  { } c a,   { } d b,   ‘Yes’  +  –  +  – 
8  { } d a,   { } c b,   ‘Yes’  +  –  –  + 
 
 
 